Copyright Registration: Why the U.S. Should Berne the Registration Requirement by Carducci, David R.
Georgia State University Law Review 
Volume 36 
Issue 3 Spring 2020 Article 7 
6-1-2020 
Copyright Registration: Why the U.S. Should Berne the 
Registration Requirement 
David R. Carducci 
Georgia State University College of Law, dcarducci1@student.gsu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David R. Carducci, Copyright Registration: Why the U.S. Should Berne the Registration Requirement, 36 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 873 (2020). 
Available at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss3/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Georgia State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Reading Room. For more 
information, please contact gfowke@gsu.edu. 
 873 
COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION: WHY THE U.S. 
SHOULD BERNE THE REGISTRATION 
REQUIREMENT 
David R. Carducci* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, registration is not a requirement to obtain 
copyright protection.1 Rather, copyright arises automatically in 
“original works of authorship” the moment they are created and 
“fixed in a tangible medium of expression.”2 However, copyrights 
are not self-enforcing.3 In fact, a copyright would be of no value 
                                                                                                             
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Georgia State University College of Law. Thank you to Cece Howard, Prof. 
Michael Landau, Austin Padgett, and Valentin Dubuis for their advice and guidance throughout writing 
this Note. To the members of the Georgia State University Law Review for their work in preparing this 
Note for publication. Additionally, I have had the good fortune to work with incredible people at 
Georgia State University College of Law without whom law school would not have been nearly as much 
fun. I am grateful for your friendship. Thank you to my parents who have supported me in all of my 
life’s endeavors. Finally, and most importantly, thank you to my son, Atticus, whose curiosity, 
creativity, and caring soul fill my heart with joy. 
 1. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2018) (“[R]egistration is not a condition of copyright protection.”); see 
Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294, 1301 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting the Copyright Act of 1976 
“created a new voluntary registration system”); Automation by Design, Inc. v. Raybestos Prods. Co., 
463 F.3d 749, 752 n.1 (7th Cir. 2006) (observing that “[r]egistration is not a condition of copyright 
protection”). “It is clear that, as to works created on and after January 1, 1978, the effective date of the 
current Copyright Act, registration is not a condition to obtaining copyright.” 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & 
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.16(A)(1) (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2018). 
 2. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018). 
The Copyright Act imposes four requirements, all of which must be met, for a work 
to qualify for copyright protection. First, the work must be original. Second, the work 
must consist of ‘expression’ and not just ‘ideas.’ Third, the work must be fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression. Finally, in the case of published works of foreign 
origin, the works must meet specified treaty-based criteria. Even if a work meets all 
these requirements, the work will not be protectable if it is a work of the United 
States government, is an official document, or consists solely of utilitarian elements 
of industrial design. 
1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.1 (3d ed. 2017). The Copyright Act defines 
“created” as “when [a work] is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first time.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 
(2018). 
 3. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers v. Pataki, 930 F. Supp. 873, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996); see Matthew Africa, Note, The Misuse of Licensing Evidence in Fair Use Analysis: New 
Technologies, New Markets, and the Courts, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1145, 1172 (2000) (“[C]opyright owners 
must act to guarantee their exclusive rights.”). 
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without the ability to sue for infringement to protect the owner’s 
exclusive rights.4 
Despite its permissive nature, registration with the United States 
Copyright Office (Copyright Office) “establishes a claim to 
copyright” while offering domestic copyright owners certain benefits 
that are not available to unregistered works.5 First, a copyright owner 
cannot bring a civil action for infringement unless he registers the 
work with the Copyright Office.6 Additionally, the owner is not 
eligible to receive statutory damages or attorney’s fees unless the 
work was registered prior to the infringement or within three months 
of the work’s publication.7 Moreover, registration creates prima facie 
evidence of the copyright’s validity, while also allowing the owner to 
further register the work with the United States Customs and Border 
Protection to guard against the importation of infringing copies.8 
Though it is undisputed that registration is required to obtain the 
above benefits, the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals were 
divided in their determination of what constituted “registration” 
                                                                                                             
 4. Washingtonian Publ’g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 39 (1939) (explaining a copyright’s “value 
depend[s] upon the possibility of enforcement”). 
 5. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR NO. 1: COPYRIGHT BASICS 4 (2017), 
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ01.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7QB-Y8TC] [hereinafter COPYRIGHT 
BASICS]. 
 6. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018) (“[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United 
States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made 
in accordance with this title.”); see Automation by Design, Inc. v. Raybestos Prods. Co., 463 F.3d 749, 
752 n.1 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[Registration] is necessary before an infringement suit may be filed in court.”); 
2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 7.16(B) (explaining that registration is a “prerequisite to suit for 
copyright infringement”); COPYRIGHT BASICS, supra note 5 (“Before an infringement suit can be filed 
in court, registration (or refusal) is necessary for works of U.S. origin.”). 
 7. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2018) (stating that registration is a “prerequisite to certain remedies for 
infringement” such as statutory damages and attorney’s fees); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, § 1.2 (“The Act 
also entitles the copyright owner to statutory damages and attorney’s fees for certain infringements only 
if the claim to copyright is registered within three months of publication.”); 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, 
supra note 1, § 7.16(C) (“[I]n order for a copyright owner to be entitled to recover statutory damages 
and attorney’s fees, the work must have been registered prior to commencement of the infringement for 
which such remedies are sought.”); COPYRIGHT BASICS, supra note 5, at 5 (noting registration is a 
requirement of eligibility for statutory damages and attorney’s fees). 
 8.  GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, § 1.2 (“[T]he Act encourages prompt registration by providing that a 
certificate of registration made within five years of a work’s first publication will automatically 
constitute prima facie evidence of the copyright’s validity and of the facts stated in the certificate.”); 
COPYRIGHT BASICS, supra note 5, at 5 (“Registration establishes prima facie evidence of the validity of 
the copyright and facts stated in the certificate when registration is made before or within five years of 
publication.”). 
2
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under the Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright Act).9 This circuit split 
raised the issue of whether registration—sufficient to sue for 
infringement per § 411 of the Copyright Act—occurs when the 
Copyright Office receives the work’s application (the “application 
approach”), or whether the Copyright Office must issue the 
certificate of registration prior to the plaintiff filing suit (the 
“registration approach”).10 On June 28, 2018, the United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to an Eleventh Circuit case, Fourth 
Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, to decide the 
issue and provide clarity to the circuit courts.11 
When examining congressional intent regarding the point at which 
registration tolls, one wonders what the practical basis is for the 
                                                                                                             
 9. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 856 F.3d 1338, 1340 (11th Cir. 
2017), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (“The question when registration occurs has split the circuits.”); 
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, § 3.15 (“[C]ourts divide on when registration has been accomplished for 
purposes of section 411’s requirement of registration as a condition to instituting an action for 
infringement.”); Edwin Komen, Eleventh Circuit Joins Split Court Decisions on Registration 
Precondition for Copyright Suits, NAT’L L. REV. (June 5, 2017), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/eleventh-circuit-joins-split-court-decisions-registration-
precondition-copyright [https://perma.cc/FG6F-D7ZG] (noting that § 411(a)’s registration requirement 
“has led to a variety of decisions from the Circuit and District Courts interpreting the meaning of 
‘registration.’ . . . None of these positions can easily be harmonized potentially leading to inconsistent 
results and forum shopping.”). 
 10. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, § 3.15; 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 7.16(B)(3)(b) (detailing 
the different approaches taken by the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals). In addition to the circuit 
split, disparity arose among district courts in circuits where the appellate court had not adopted either 
approach. Alexander Kaplan, Copyright Registration Debate May Head to High Court, LAW360 (Nov. 
2, 2017, 12:56 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/980641/copyright-registration-debate-may-head-
to-high-court [https://perma.cc/PA2E-R7B9]. For example, take the Second Circuit Court of Appeals: 
Due to the high volume of copyright infringement cases that come before the Second 
Circuit, its reluctance to endorse a particular side of the debate is particularly 
noteworthy. In Psihoyos v. John Wiley & Sons Inc., 748 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2014), one 
of the Second Circuit’s most recent cases on the matter, the plaintiff had not yet 
submitted an application and therefore would have been unable to satisfy either 
approach. As a result, the court was able to avoid taking sides in the debate, stating 
“we need not resolve the dispute or otherwise embroil ourselves in this circuit split.” 
A year later, the Second Circuit again declined to choose an approach. 
 Because of the Second Circuit’s hesitance to take sides, there remains a lack of 
uniformity within the district courts. While a few cases have adopted the application 
approach, including as recently as 2016, it has not been the predominant view and in 
both the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York. Rather, the majority of cases in 
each district, including the most recent decision on the issue, have followed the 
registration approach. 
Id. 
 11. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 2707, 2707 (2018) (mem.). 
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requirement. Under the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention), registration is a 
formality that is not required in any instance.12 In fact, Article 5(2) of 
the Berne Convention states, “[t]he enjoyment and the exercise of 
[the copyright owner’s] rights shall not be subject to any 
formality . . . .”13 As the United States is a Berne Convention 
member, one would think that it should follow the standard on 
formalities set forth by the Berne Convention in the same manner as 
the other 175 Berne member states.14 
The following note discusses the registration requirement under 
the Copyright Act and its interplay with the Berne Convention’s 
prohibition of formalities. Part I explains the recent division between 
the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals and provides an in-depth 
analysis of the application and registration approaches. Part II details 
the Supreme Court’s adoption of the registration approach in Fourth 
Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC. Part III gives a 
brief history of the Berne Convention and examines registration 
under Berne as a nonessential formality. Finally, Part IV offers a 
proposed long-term solution to amend the Copyright Act by making 
registration a truly permissive formality and eliminating registration 
as a prerequisite to file suit for the infringement of United States 
works. 
 
                                                                                                             
 12. SUTHERLAND ASBILL & BRENNAN LLP, BERNE CONVENTION BASICS 2 (2004), 
https://us.eversheds-sutherland.com/portalresource/lookup/poid/Z1tOl9NPluKPtDNIqLMRV56Pab6 
TfzcRXncKbDtRr9tObDdEuSZDo0!/fileUpload.name=/BerneConvention.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8MD-
F5BW] [hereinafter BERNE CONVENTION BASICS] (“Under Berne, no formalities are required as 
preconditions to protection. In other words, member countries cannot require that authors and publishers 
give notice of the copyright status of the work in order for the work to be protected by law (e.g., 
mandatory use of a © symbol or required registration of copyrighted works).”). 
 13. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 5, § 2, Sept. 9, 1886, 25 
U.S.T. 1341, 1161 U.N.T.S. 30 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
 14. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR NO. 38A: INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT RELATIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES 3 (2018), https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ38a.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CDY-9V7M] 
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT RELATIONS OF U.S.]. 
4
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [], Art. 7
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss3/7
2020] COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION 877 
I.   A Split in the Circuits 
A.   Registration as a Prerequisite to Bring a Civil Suit for 
Copyright Infringement 
The question of timely registration becomes relevant when an 
unregistered work has been infringed and the copyright owner seeks 
to file suit.15 When this occurs, courts are concerned with the points 
at which the “plaintiff seeks to register; the Copyright Office issues 
the certificate; and the lawsuit commences.”16 Courts will dismiss an 
infringement suit if the plaintiff has filed a complaint before 
registering the copyright with the Copyright Office.17 
Section 410(d) of the Copyright Act states, “[t]he effective date of 
a copyright registration is the day on which an application, deposit, 
and fee . . . have all been received in the Copyright Office.”18 
Legislative history further provides, “[w]here the three necessary 
elements are received at different times the date of receipt of the last 
of them is controlling, regardless of when the Copyright Office acts 
on the claim.”19 Unfortunately, the Copyright Act gives a circular 
definition of “registration,” which provides little clarity regarding 
what it means to effectively register a work.20 As such, controversies 
arise in determining the “effective date” of registration so that a 
plaintiff may initiate an infringement suit. Before Fourth Estate, two 
views existed on this matter: (1) registration does not occur until the 
Register of Copyrights issues the registration certificate (the 
registration approach), and (2) the registration requirement is met 
when the Copyright Office receives the completed application, 
deposit, and fee (the application approach).21 
                                                                                                             
 15. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 7.16(B)(3)(a) (stating when “the copyright owner 
registers the subject work years before infringement commences . . . filing suit later based on the 
registration certificate is straightforward.”). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See id. § 7.16(B)(1)(a) (“[R]egistration is a condition precedent for an infringement case to move 
forward in federal court.”). 
 18. 17 U.S.C. § 410(d) (2018). 
 19. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 157 (1976). 
 20. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (“‘Registration’ . . . means a registration of a claim in the original or the 
renewed and extended term of copyright.”). 
 21. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 856 F.3d 1338, 1339 (11th Cir. 
5
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1.   The Registration Approach 
Circuit courts that adopted the registration approach applied a 
formalistic reading of the Copyright Act’s plain language.22 As its 
name suggests, this approach “tends towards hyper-technical 
application, in which the paper certificate is required as a condition 
to suit.”23 Beyond the approach’s plain reading of the Copyright Act, 
the Tenth Circuit gave credence to the registration approach by citing 
the oft-quoted Judge Learned Hand: 
[T]he text of the [statute] denies the right to sue for 
infringement “until the provisions of this title with respect 
to the deposit of copies and registration of such work shall 
have been complied with[]” . . . . Since the owner must 
submit an application and pay the required fees in order to 
make a deposit, we can think of no other added condition 
for “registration” but acceptance by the Register.24 
The Tenth Circuit also relied on a history of statutory 
interpretation—dating back to the Copyright Act of 1909—that 
similarly requires registration to be completed prior to filing suit.25 
More recently, in 2017, the Eleventh Circuit found in Fourth Estate 
                                                                                                             
2017), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (“This appeal requires us to decide an issue that has divided the 
circuits: whether registration occurs when an owner files an application to register the copyright or when 
the Register of Copyrights registers the copyright.”); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, § 3.15. “The Tenth 
Circuit appears to have coined the terms ‘application approach’ and ‘registration approach’ in describing 
the two schools of thought.” Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 615 n.3 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (citing La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1202–04 (10th 
Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010)). 
 22. La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1202; see, e.g., M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 
903 F.2d 1486, 1489 (11th Cir. 1990); Specific Software Sols., LLC v. Inst. of Workcomp Advisors, 
615 F. Supp. 2d 708, 715–16 (M.D. Tenn. 2009), abrogated in part by Sony/ATV Music Publ’g LLC v. 
D.J. Miller Music Distribs., No. 3:09-cv-01098, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103795, at *13 (M.D. Tenn. 
Sept. 28, 2010). 
 23. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 7.16(B)(3)(b)(i) (emphasis added). But see La Resolana 
Architects, 416 F.3d at 1202–03 (stating the Copyright Act “demonstrates that registration is separate 
from the issuance of a registration certificate and that a court’s jurisdiction does not turn on the 
existence of a paper certificate, but rather on the fact of registration, however it is demonstrated”). 
 24. La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1202 (quoting Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, 
Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 F.2d 637, 640–41 (2d Cir. 1958)). 
 25. Id. at 1199. 
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that “the text of the Copyright Act makes clear the registration 
approach . . . is correct.”26 After examining the registration process 
put forth in §§ 408 and 410, the Eleventh Circuit concluded “[the 
Copyright Act] establishes that registration can occur only after 
application and examination.”27 
2.   The Application Approach 
Opposite the registration approach is the application approach. 
Under the application approach, § 411’s registration requirement is 
met when the Copyright Office receives a work’s completed 
application, deposit, and fee.28 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits officially 
adopted the application approach prior to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Fourth Estate.29 Although the Eighth Circuit did not 
formally employ this approach, it endorsed it in dictum.30 
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit has self-contradicting dicta as to 
which approach best comports with the statute.31 
When examining these two “interpretive camp[s],” the Tenth 
Circuit noted that the application approach uses a “policy-based 
methodology”:  
                                                                                                             
 26. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 856 F.3d at 1341. 
 27. Id. (emphasis added); see 17 U.S.C. §§ 408, 410 (2018). Regarding § 410(d), the court stated: 
Section 410(d) also supports the registration approach, . . . relat[ing] registration back 
to the date that the owner files an application, but section 410(d) also makes evident 
that registration occurs only after the Register of Copyrights deems an application “to 
be acceptable.” Like other provisions of Title 17, section 410(d) establishes that 
registration occurs only after review and approval by the Register of Copyrights. 
Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 856 F.3d at 1341–42 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 410(d)). 
 28. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, § 3.15 (defining the application approach as “a claim to copyright 
registered, so that a lawsuit can be filed, at the time the complete application is received in the 
Copyright Office”). See generally 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 7.16(B)(3)(b)(ii). 
 29. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 621 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding “receipt 
by the Copyright Office of a complete application satisfies the registration requirement of § 411(a)”); 
Positive Black Talk, Inc. v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 365 (5th Cir. 2004), abrogated on 
other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010) (noting that the Fifth Circuit 
follows the application approach). 
 30. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 856 F.3d at 1340 (citing Action Tapes, Inc. v. Mattson, 462 
F.3d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 2006)). 
 31. Compare Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc. 354 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[A]n 
application for registration must be filed before the copyright can be sued upon.”), with Gaiman v. 
McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 655 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[A]n application to register must be filed, and either 
granted or refused, before suit can be brought.”). 
7
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Looking to the Act, courts adopting the Application 
approach conclude that because a copyright owner can sue 
regardless of whether an application for registration is 
ultimately granted or rejected, delaying the date on which a 
copyright owner can sue is a senseless formality. These 
courts also rely on the language of § 408, that registration is 
not a condition of copyright protection, and § 410(d), that 
once a copyright is registered, the effective date of the 
registration relates back to the date the Copyright Office 
received the last of the filing materials (i.e., the deposit, 
fee, and application). 
 
Finally, these courts look to the date of the application for 
registration as a condition to filing an infringement action, 
[but] issuance of a registration certificate is a condition to 
statutory damages and other statutory remedies. Thus, the 
argument goes, a copyright owner can get into court 
without being held hostage by the vagaries of the Copyright 
Office in its ministerial act of issuing the certificate.32 
Further, some argue that the application approach helps ensure 
infringement filings are not delayed for months, if not longer, thereby 
allowing plaintiffs to sue without fearing that the statute of 
limitations will expire.33 An amicus brief submitted to the Supreme 
Court on behalf of Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation noted 
that “delays of a year or more are not uncommon,” and processing 
time for some works “is so long that it exceeds the Copyright Act’s 
three-year limitations period for infringement suits.”34 
                                                                                                             
 32. La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1203–04 (10th Cir. 2005), 
abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010) (citations 
omitted); see Int’l Kitchen Exhaust Cleaning Ass’n v. Power Washers of N. Am., 81 F. Supp. 2d 70, 72 
(D.D.C. 2000) (endorsing the application approach because it “best effectuate[s] the interests of justice 
and promote[s] judicial economy”). 
 33. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, § 3.15. 
 34. Brief for The Nat’l Music Publishers’ Ass’n & Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. et. al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 
2707 (2018) (mem.) (No. 17-571), 2018 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3235, at *8. Amici’s members “are 
leading music trade organizations and performing rights societies representing the interests of music 
8
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B.   Circuits Applying the Registration Approach 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently weighed the two 
approaches and opted for the registration approach in Fourth Estate 
Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC—the case in which the 
Supreme Court ultimately resolved the circuit split.35 In this case, 
Wall-Street.com continued to display online articles produced by 
Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation despite termination of the 
parties’ licensing agreement.36 Though Fourth Estate filed an 
application to register the works at issue, the Copyright Office had 
not yet registered the copyrights at the time Fourth Estate filed suit 
against Wall-Street.com for copyright infringement.37 
In holding that “[f]iling an application does not amount to 
registration,” the circuit court found the text of the Copyright Act 
“establishes that registration occurs only after review and approval 
by the Register of Copyrights.”38 The court relied on § 410(a)’s 
language, which provides registration occurs “after examination” by 
                                                                                                             
publishers, record companies, and individual songwriters and composers. Amici’s 
members . . . collectively register tens of thousands of musical works and sound recordings each year 
with the Copyright Office.” Id. at 1. 
 35. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 856 F.3d at 1341; see infra Part II. 
 36. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 856 F.3d at 1339. Fourth Estate is a news organization 
specializing in online journalism. Id. 
 37. Id. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted 
Wall-Street.com’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss where the plaintiff had filed a completed application with 
the Copyright Office, but the Register of Copyrights had not yet decided on the application. Fourth 
Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, No. 16-60497-Civ-Scola, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
187499, at *3–4 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2016), aff’d, 856 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[Registration is] a 
procedural bar to infringement claims. . . . As a result, because a plaintiff must first obtain registration 
for the work at issue prior to initiating suit, the Court must dismiss Fourth Estate’s claims for copyright 
infringement.”).  
 38. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 856 F.3d at 1341–42 (emphasis added). “Fourth Estate has not 
alleged infringement of any registered work.” Id. at 1342 (emphasis added). The court explained the 
registration process as follows: 
The Copyright Act defines registration as a process that requires action by both the 
copyright owner and the Copyright Office. A copyright owner must first deposit a 
copy of the material with the Copyright Office, file an application, and pay a fee. The 
Register of Copyrights then examines the material. If the material is copyrightable the 
Register shall register the claim and issue to the applicant a certificate of registration. 
If the material deposited does not constitute copyrightable subject matter, the Register 
shall refuse registration and shall notify the applicant in writing of the reasons for 
such refusal. 
Id. at 1341 (citations omitted). 
9
Carducci: Copyright Registration: Why the U.S. Should Berne the Registratio
Published by Reading Room,
882 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:3 
the Register.39 Further, the court noted the Register “would have no 
power to ‘refuse registration’” if it were effectuated by merely filing 
an application.40 Additionally, though Fourth Estate argued that 
§ 410(d) shows congressional intent to establish the application 
approach by relating registration back to the date when the copyright 
owner files an application, the court interpreted that section as 
supporting the registration approach because “[l]ike other provisions 
of [the Copyright Act], section 410(d) establishes that registration 
occurs only after review and approval by the Register of 
Copyrights.”41 Lastly, the court determined that the three-year statute 
of limitations for copyright infringement further supports the 
registration approach, seeing it as a deliberate choice the legislature 
made to encourage registration.42 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also adopted the registration 
approach.43 In La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 
                                                                                                             
 39. Id. The statute provides: 
When, after examination, the Register of Copyrights determines that, in accordance 
with the provisions of this title, the material deposited constitutes copyrightable 
subject matter and that the other legal and formal requirements of this title have been 
met, the Register shall register the claim and issue to the applicant a certificate of 
registration under the seal of the Copyright Office. 
17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (2018) (emphasis added). “After” is defined as “during the period of time following 
(an event).” After, THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 28 (Elizabeth J. Jewell & Frank Abate 
eds., 2001). 
 40. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 856 F.3d at 1341. The court stated: 
Section 410(b) also establishes that registration can occur only after application and 
examination. That section states, “In any case in which the Register of Copyrights 
determines that . . . the Register shall refuse registration.” And section 411(a) allows 
a copyright holder who filed an application for registration to file an infringement suit 
if “registration has been refused.” 
Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. §§ 410(b), 411(a) (2018)). 
 41. Id. at 1342 (emphasis added). The statute provides: “The effective date of a copyright 
registration is the day on which an application, deposit, and fee, which are later determined by the 
Register of Copyrights or by a court of competent jurisdiction to be acceptable for registration, have all 
been received in the Copyright Office.” 17 U.S.C. § 410(d). 
 42. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 856 F.3d at 1342. The court stated: 
True, an owner who files an application late in the statute of limitations period risks 
losing the right to enforce his copyright in an infringement action because of the time 
needed to review an application. But this potential loss encourages an owner to 
register his copyright soon after he obtains the copyright and before infringement 
occurs. 
Id. 
 43. La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1208 (10th Cir. 2005), 
abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010) (“A suit for 
10
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the court held that an architecture firm could not sue a developer for 
infringement of building plans because the firm had not yet received 
confirmation from the Copyright Office that it had registered the 
copyrights in the plans.44 Similar to the Eleventh Circuit in Fourth 
Estate, the La Resolana court relied on the plain language of the 
Copyright Act in determining that the registration approach is the 
better reading of the statute.45 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that 
registration “requires a series of affirmative steps by both the 
applicant and the Copyright Office.”46 Although the Copyright Office 
confirmed receipt of the firm’s application, no admissible evidence 
could confirm that the applicant completed registration.47 Therefore, 
the circuit court held that the case had been properly dismissed.48 
                                                                                                             
copyright infringement cannot be brought unless and until the copyright is registered.”); 10th Circuit 
Rules Plaintiffs Must Register Copyrights Before Filing Suit, ANDREWS INTELL. PROP. LITIG. REP., Aug. 
25, 2005, at *2, 2005 WL 2036166 (“The appeals court said the law’s plain meaning is that a potential 
plaintiff must first have registered the copyright.”). 
 44. La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1208. La Resolana applied to register its copyrights in the 
plans and sued Clay Realtors for copyright infringement on November 20, 2003, after receiving 
confirmation from the Copyright Office that it had received the application materials. Id. at 1197. Clay 
Realtors moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that La Resolana could not sue for infringement until 
it had received a certificate of registration from the Copyright Office. Id. La Resolana responded with a 
letter from the Copyright Office, dated March 10, 2004, stating that the Register of Copyrights had 
registered the drawings on January 22, 2004, with an effective registration date of November 19, 2003 
(one day before La Resolana filed suit). Id. at 1197–98. Still, La Resolana had not yet received a 
certificate of registration from the Copyright Office. Id. at 1198. The United States District Court for the 
District of New Mexico found the March 10 letter to be inadmissible hearsay and dismissed the case 
without prejudice because the drawings were not registered at the time La Resolana filed suit. Id. The 
Tenth Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling on appeal. La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1208. 
 45. Id. at 1200–05. 
 46. Id. at 1200. The court stated: 
No language in the Act suggests that registration is accomplished by mere receipt of 
copyrightable material by the Copyright Office. Instead, the Register of Copyrights 
must affirmatively determine copyright protection is warranted § 411 before 
registration occurs under the Act. And only upon registration or refusal to register is a 
copyright holder entitled to sue for copyright infringement under § 411. Until those 
steps are followed and registration is “made,” federal courts lack subject matter 
jurisdiction over the infringement claim. 
Id. at 1200–01. 
 47. Id. at 1208. The court opined that the March 10 letter relating registration back to November 19, 
2003, “should have been sufficient evidence of registration,” acknowledging that “[p]roving a copyright 
is registered can be accomplished in a variety of [adequate] ways” and that showing the certificate of 
registration “is not required to demonstrate registration.” Id. However, the court found that the letter was 
inadmissible because La Resolana did not appeal the district court’s finding that it was unauthenticated 
hearsay. La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1208. Even so, the circuit court indicated the “the better 
practice” is to rely on extrinsic evidence when examining subject matter jurisdiction. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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C.   Circuits Applying the Application Approach 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is one example of a circuit that 
favors the application approach.49 In Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. 
IAC/InteractiveCorp, the Ninth Circuit adopted the application 
approach, holding that § 411’s registration requirement is satisfied 
upon the Copyright Office’s receipt of a completed application.50 In 
this case, Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. alleged that IAC/InteractiveCorp, 
Home Shopping Network, Inc., HSN LP, and HSN General Partner 
LLC (collectively “HSN”) infringed on its copyright in a necklace by 
manufacturing and distributing a “virtually identical” necklace.51 
Cosmetic applied for copyright registration of its necklace on March 
6, 2008. The Copyright Office sent Cosmetic confirmation that it 
received Cosmetic’s application on March 12, 2008.52 Cosmetic filed 
suit against HSN on March 27, 2008—before it had received a 
registration certificate from the Copyright Office.53 Accordingly, the 
                                                                                                             
 49. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 621–22 (9th Cir. 2010). The Fifth 
Circuit also upheld the application approach in Positive Black Talk, Inc. v. Cash Money Records, Inc. 
394 F.3d 357, 365 (5th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 
U.S. 154 (2010). In Positive Black Talk, two New Orleans based rappers released songs using the same 
unique phrase. Id. at 363. D.J. Jubilee received a certificate of registration from the Copyright Office for 
his song Back That Ass Up in 2000. Id. On February 15, 2002, Positive Black Talk (“PBT”) filed a 
supplemental registration application to add itself as an additional author of the song and filed suit 
against Cash Money for its song Back That Azz Up on the same day. Id. at 363–64. However, the 
Copyright Office did not receive the supplemental application until February 19, 2002—four days after 
PBT filed suit. Id. at 364. Favoring judicial economy, the district court declined to dismiss PBT’s case, 
even though it acknowledged that PBT had failed the registration prerequisite to file an infringement 
suit and allowed PBT to cure the initial application. Id. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that “the 
jurisdictional defect was cured when the Copyright Office received PBT’s application, deposit, and fee 
four days after PBT filed suit.” Positive Black Talk, 394 F.3d at 365 (emphasis added). The court stated 
that allowing plaintiffs to amend their complaints supports the principle that technicalities should not 
prevent a party from having its day in court. Id. at 366. Further, the circuit court reasoned that—because 
PBT had complied with the substantive requirement of § 411 by filing a registration application, deposit, 
and fee—“‘considerations of finality, efficiency, and economy’ counsel us to disregard the technical 
defect in timing in this particular case.” Id. at 367 (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 75 
(1996)). 
 50. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 621; see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, § 3.15 (noting that the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded in Cosmetic Ideas that “the application approach is the better 
alternative”). 
 51. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 613–14. In 1997, Cosmetic designed a necklace known as the Lady 
Caroline Lorgnette which it began selling through various stores and websites in 1999. Id. at 614. HSN 
began manufacturing and distributing its necklace between 2005 and 2008. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53.  Id. 
12
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [], Art. 7
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss3/7
2020] COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION 885 
United States District Court for the Central District of California 
dismissed Cosmetic’s claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.54 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit first relied on the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick that “§ 411(a)’s 
registration requirement is a precondition to filing a claim that does 
not restrict a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.”55 The court 
analyzed what it means to register a copyrighted work by looking at 
the plain language of the Copyright Act.56 The court also considered 
whether the application approach or registration approach better 
achieves the Copyright Act’s purpose.57 
Looking at the Copyright Act’s plain language, the court examined 
§§ 410(a), 408(a), 411(a), and 410(d).58 Like the Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits, the Ninth Circuit found that §§ 410(a) and 411(a) suggest 
that, in addition to filing an application, registration requires that the 
Register take affirmative steps.59 In spite of this, the court determined 
that § 408’s permissive registration requirements blur the lines 
between the two approaches, favoring the application approach.60 
                                                                                                             
 54. Id. 
 55. Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 157. 
 56. Alexander D. Boyd, Reducing the Register of Copyrights to the Receiver of Applications: The 
Ninth Circuit in Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp. Erroneously Interpreted the Copyright 
Act’s Registration Requirement and Adopted the Application Approach, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 499, 
503 (2011). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 616–18. 
 59. Id. at 617. Regarding § 410(a), the court noted that the provision requiring the Register to 
examine the application materials and register the claim if the requirements have been met “places an 
active burden of examination and registration upon the Register, suggesting that registration is not 
accomplished by application alone.” Id. The section provides: 
When, after examination, the Register of Copyrights determines that, in accordance 
with the provisions of this title, the material deposited constitutes copyrightable 
subject matter and that the other legal and formal requirements of this title have been 
met, the Register shall register the claim and issue to the applicant a certificate of 
registration under the seal of the Copyright Office. 
17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (2018). Additionally, the court indicated that § 411(a) “could be read to mean that 
Congress intended registration to require acceptance or refusal by the Register, not mere delivery.” 
Section 411(a) of the statute provides: 
In any case, however, where the deposit, application, and fee required for registration 
have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and registration has been 
refused, the applicant is entitled to institute a civil action for infringement if notice 
thereof, with a copy of the complaint, is served on the Register of Copyrights. 
Id. § 411(a) (2018). 
 60. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617 (“[§ 408] implies that the sole requirement for obtaining 
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The Ninth Circuit also observed that § 410(d)—relating registration 
back to the date that the Copyright Office receives the application, 
deposit, and fee—does not clearly support one approach over the 
other.61 Backdating registration to the application date “supports the 
interpretation that application is the critical event”; however, the 
court acknowledged that this subsection could also be read to require 
the Copyright Office to decide on the application before the work is 
registered.62 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the plain 
language of the Copyright Act is ambiguous and does not 
“unequivocally support[] either the registration or application 
approach.”63 
The court then turned to the purpose of the Copyright Act.64 After 
discussing the statute’s history, the Cosmetic Ideas court considered 
three policy arguments in holding that the purpose of the Copyright 
Act is better satisfied by the application approach.65 First, the court 
noted that the application approach avoids delays in copyright 
infringement suits.66 Though a plaintiff can litigate an infringement 
claim regardless of whether the registration is accepted or refused, 
under the registration approach, the plaintiff must wait until the 
Register has decided on the registration before the suit can proceed.67 
                                                                                                             
registration is delivery of the appropriate documents and fee.”). Section 408 of the Copyright Act 
provides in pertinent part: 
[T]he owner of copyright of any exclusive right in the work may obtain registration 
of the copyright claim by delivering to the Copyright Office the deposit specified by 
this section, together with the application and fee specified . . . . Such registration is 
not a condition of copyright protection. 
17 U.S.C. § 408 (2018). 
 61. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 618. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 618–21; see also Boyd, supra note 56, at 506. 
 66. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 620. 
 67. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018) (allowing an applicant to institute an infringement suit after 
registration has been refused); Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 619–20. Allowing an applicant to file suit 
after the Copyright Office has refused the registration was a major change from the Copyright Act of 
1909 to the Copyright Act of 1976. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, § 3.15.1. “Under the 1909 Copyright Act, 
a copyright claimant whose application had been rejected by the Copyright Office could institute a 
copyright infringement action only if it first prevailed in a mandamus action against the Register of 
Copyrights to compel the issuance of a certificate.” Id. (citing Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre 
Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 F.2d 637, 640–41 (2d Cir. 1958)). 
14
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The court reasoned that the application approach avoids this practice 
of “wait and see” by permitting a plaintiff to institute an infringement 
suit once the application materials have been received by the 
Copyright Office.68 
Next, the court determined that approval or refusal of registration 
prior to filing suit is the type of “needless formality” that Congress 
attempted to eliminate in writing the Copyright Act.69 The court did 
not see the logic in dismissing a case that would likely be refiled 
shortly thereafter “simply because the Copyright Office has not made 
a prompt decision that will have no substantive impact on whether or 
not a litigant can ultimately proceed.”70 Additionally, the court 
recognized that a plaintiff who applies for registration toward the end 
of the three-year statute of limitations for copyright infringement 
may see the statute of limitations expire while waiting for the 
Copyright Office to make a determination on the registration.71 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit found the argument that Congress 
required deference to the Register to be unpersuasive.72 Quoting a 
leading treatise on American copyright law, the court explained that 
“the pace of litigation entails that the Copyright Office will typically 
have granted or refused registration during its pendency.”73 
Therefore, the Register will still have an opportunity to appear in the 
lawsuit.74 Furthermore, the court reasoned that because the Register’s 
registration decisions are ultimately reviewable by the courts, there is 
                                                                                                             
 68. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 620; see also 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, 
§ 7.16(B)(3)(b)(ii). 
 69. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 620. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2018) (providing a three-year statute of limitations for copyright 
infringement); 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 7.16(B)(3)(b)(iii) (noting that the three-year 
statute of limitations for copyright infringement “may indeed occasion complete inability to recover 
damages” under the registration approach). 
 72. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 621. 
 73. Id. (quoting 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 7.16(B)(1)(a)(i)). NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
has been quoted by the Supreme Court of the United States, all of the Circuit Courts of Appeals, and 
several federal district courts dealing with copyright issues. David Nimmer, IRELL & MANELLA LLP, 
https://www.irell.com/professionals-51.html [https://perma.cc/AY5Z-377Q] (last visited Mar. 9, 2020). 
 74. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 621. 
15
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no compelling justification to delay registration until the Register has 
acted on an application.75 
D.   The American System: The Registration Approach Versus the 
Application Approach 
At the beginning of his Alicea v. Machete Music opinion, First 
Circuit Judge Jeffrey R. Howard noted that “[o]ver a century ago, 
Mark Twain lamented that ‘[o]nly one thing is impossible for God: to 
find any sense in any copyright law on the planet.’”76 It seems that 
not only God, but also the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals 
are vexed by copyright law. This vexation is illuminated by the 
circuits’ differing interpretations of copyright registration.77 
1.   The Plain Language of the Copyright Act of 1976 
Simply defining registration as a “registration of a claim” does 
nothing to tell the copyright owner, let alone the courts, what 
constitutes registration.78 As a result of this circular and unhelpful 
definition, courts analyzed the language of the statute as a whole to 
establish the legislature’s intended meaning of the term.79 This plain 
language reading informs courts when determining whether § 411’s 
registration requirement has been met.80 
First, § 408 of the Copyright Act makes registration permissive.81 
As a result, courts such as the Ninth Circuit in Cosmetic Ideas have 
                                                                                                             
 75. Id. 
 76. Alicea v. Machete Music, 744 F.3d 773, 775 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting MARK TWAIN, THE 
COMPLETE WORKS OF MARK TWAIN: MARK TWAIN’S NOTEBOOK 381 (Albert Bigelow Paine ed., 
1935)). 
 77. See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 56, at 499 (“[T]he United States Circuit Courts of Appeals disagree 
as to when [copyright registration] actually occurs.”). 
 78. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (defining “registration” as “a registration of a claim in the original or 
renewed and extended term of copyright”). 
 79. See, e.g., Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 2010). 
Importantly, the Supreme Court has stated that “statutory language cannot be construed in a vacuum. It 
is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context 
and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989). 
 80. See, e.g., Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 856 F.3d 1338, 1341–42 
(11th Cir. 2017), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019); Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d 612, 616–18. 
 81. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2018). The section provides: 
16
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ruled that this section “blurs the line” between the two approaches 
but seems to favor the application approach.82 Indeed, as registration 
is not required to obtain a copyright, it should also be nonessential 
when enforcing the copyright owner’s exclusive rights. However, the 
statute’s language that the copyright owner “may obtain registration 
of the copyright claim” is viewed by some as evidence that the 
Copyright Act “envisions substantive review of the material by the 
Register of Copyrights” prior to registration being made.83 Yet, the 
Copyright Act also provides that an owner obtains registration “by 
delivering to the Copyright Office” the application, deposit, and 
fee.84 This process puts the onus on the copyright owner, suggesting 
that she effectuates registration upon delivery of the application 
materials. Still, given that neither the application nor the registration 
approach advocates for the complete elimination of § 411’s 
registration requirement, § 408’s permissive registration does not 
seem to provide support for one approach over the other. 
Next, proponents of both approaches acknowledge that   
§ 410(a)—the subsection governing registration of a claim and 
issuance of a certificate—favors the registration approach because 
the subsection requires a series of steps by the Copyright Office 
before effectuating registration.85 Per the statute, registration only 
                                                                                                             
At any time during the subsistence of the first term of copyright in any published or 
unpublished work in which the copyright was secured before January 1, 1978, and 
during the subsistence of any copyright secured on or after that date, the owner of 
copyright or of any exclusive right in the work may obtain registration of the 
copyright claim by delivering to the Copyright Office the deposit specified by this 
section, together with the application and fee specified by sections 409 and 708. Such 
registration is not a condition of copyright protection. 
Id.; see also Deepa Varadarajan, The Trade Secret-Contract Interface, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1543, 1555 
(2018) (“There is no application or claiming requirement to obtain copyright protection. Instead, for a 
work to be copyrightable, it need only satisfy a low threshold of originality (i.e., be independently 
created and exhibit a ‘modicum of creativity’) and be fixed in a tangible medium of expression.”). 
 82. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617. 
 83. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (emphasis added); La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 
F.3d 1195, 1201 (10th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 
U.S. 154 (2010); see also Boyd, supra note 56, at 529 (arguing that “[t]he only language [in § 408(a)] 
that would support the application approach is shall obtain, rather than may obtain”) (emphasis added). 
 84. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a). 
 85. See Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 856 F.3d at 1341 (finding “the phrase ‘after examination’ 
in section 410(a) makes explicit that an application alone is insufficient for registration”); Cosmetic 
Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617 (observing that § 410(a) “places an active burden of examination and registration 
17
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occurs “after examination” by the Register.86 Additionally, it is up to 
the Register to actually register the copyright and issue the 
registration certificate.87 Further, § 410(b) puts the denial of 
registration in the Register’s hands.88 Taken together, these 
subsections make the Register the determining factor in whether 
registration is approved or denied. This language supports the 
proposition that registration requires review and affirmative steps by 
the Register. In contrast, merely delivering an application to the 
Copyright Office does not require the Register to take any action. 
Then again, though determining the date of registration under 
§ 410(d) also requires action by the Register, the subsection better 
supports the application approach. Section 410(d) sets a registration’s 
effective date as the date the Copyright Office received the 
application materials.89 Courts differed in their interpretation of this 
section when examining a plaintiff’s ability to bring an infringement 
suit.90 For example, though the Eleventh Circuit viewed § 410(d) as 
further requiring the Register to act to effectuate the copyright’s 
registration, the Ninth Circuit observed that backdating registration to 
                                                                                                             
upon the Register, suggesting that registration is not accomplished by application alone”); La Resolana 
Architects, 416 F.3d at 1201 (noting that § 410(a) requires “affirmative acts by the Register”). 
 86. 17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (2018). 
 87. Id. (stating “the Register shall register the claim and issue to the applicant a certificate of 
registration”). 
 88. Id. § 410(b) (“In any case in which the Register of Copyrights determines that . . . the material 
deposited does not constitute copyrightable subject matter or that the claim is invalid for any other 
reason, the Register shall refuse registration . . . .”) (emphasis added); see Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit 
Corp., 856 F.3d at 1341 (holding § 410(b) “establishes that registration can occur only after application 
and examination . . . [i]f registration occurred as soon as an application was filed, then the Register of 
Copyrights would have no power to ‘refuse registration’”). 
 89. Section 410(d) of the Copyright Act provides: “The effective date of a copyright registration is 
the day on which an application, deposit, and fee, which are later determined by the Register of 
Copyrights or by a court of competent jurisdiction to be acceptable for registration, have all been 
received in the Copyright Office.” 17 U.S.C. § 410(d). 
 90. Though the courts are divided on this issue in regard to § 411’s registration requirement to file a 
civil infringement suit, one treatise recognizes that: 
Connecting a registration’s effective date to the date on which a complete application 
is received by the Copyright Office rarely presents issues when the question is 
whether the registration was sufficiently timely to qualify the registration certificate 
for prima facie effect under section 410(c) or to qualify the copyright owner for 
statutory damages and attorney’s fees under section 412 . . . .  
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, at § 3.15. 
18
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the application date implies that the application is the crucial 
component to registration.91 
To illustrate this point, consider the following: the Copyright 
Office registers an extremely high volume of works each year.92 The 
online registration system began the 2018 fiscal year with more than 
336,220 open claims and ended the year with more than 248,000 
claims still open in the system.93 In 2017, the registration system 
closed with nearly 20,000 more open claims than were in the system 
at the beginning of the fiscal year.94 This disparity suggests a 
significant lag time between submitting an application and receiving 
a certificate of registration.95 Even with a time lapse of several 
months, Congress saw fit to relate the effective date of registration 
back to when the Copyright Office receives a completed application. 
Regardless of any affirmative steps the Register has to make in 
                                                                                                             
 91. Compare Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 856 F.3d at 1342 (“[S]ection 410(d) establishes that 
registration occurs only after review and approval by the Register of Copyrights.”), and La Resolana 
Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1204 n.9 (10th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other 
grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010) (“It is not logical to assume that the 
relation-back provision subsumes the explicit requirements of § 411 . . . .”), with Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. 
IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 618 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that “[b]ecause [§ 410(d)] dates a 
later-approved registration as of the date of its application, it supports the interpretation that the 
application is the critical event”). 
 92. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL 2018, at 2 (2019), 
https://copyright.gov/reports/annual/2018/ar2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2YA-34QZ] (noting that the 
Copyright Office examined more than 640,000 registration claims in 2018). 
 93. Id. at 6. 
 94. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FISCAL 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2018), 
https://copyright.gov/reports/annual/2017/ar2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6RY-325W] (detailing that the 
online registration system began the 2017 fiscal year with 316,000 open claims but ended the year with 
more than 335,000 claims still open in the system). 
 95. An amicus brief submitted to the Supreme Court on behalf of Fourth Estate notes that “the wait 
from the time of submission to the issuance of certificate can be daunting . . . . [D]elays of a year or 
more are not uncommon.” Brief for The Nat’l Music Publishers’ Ass’n & Recording Indus. Ass’n of 
Am. et. al., supra note 34, at 21. These long delays seem to be indiscriminate of a copyright owner’s 
level of notoriety: 
To cite recent examples, on April 11, 2017, a music publisher submitted its 
registration materials for a musical work written by Justin Timberlake . . . . Although 
the registration submission included the required payment, deposit of the work, and 
application, the Office still has not issued a certificate of registration or refused to do 
so—a delay of 14 months and counting. Similarly, registration materials for a musical 
work . . .  by Neil Diamond were submitted to the Copyright Office on February 2, 
2017, with all of the statutory requirements completed on that date . . . . The 
certificate of registration has yet to be issued—a delay of more than 16 months. 
Id.  
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eventually ensuring that an owner receives a certificate for his 
registered copyright, Congress elected to make the application date 
paramount when determining copyright registration. 
2.   The Purpose of Copyright Law 
Beyond the statute’s text, consider also which approach best 
comports with the legislative purpose of copyright law. First, though 
the Copyright Act did not remove registration as a prerequisite to 
filing an infringement suit, the statute allows an applicant to 
ultimately file suit regardless of whether the Register eventually 
approves or denies the registration.96 This language implies that 
Congress intended the application—rather than the certificate—to be 
the determining factor in filing suit.97 This interpretation is supported 
by Congress’s deliberate elimination of unnecessary formalities with 
the Copyright Act.98 Additionally, the Copyright Office’s 
determination on whether a work is copyrightable is not binding on 
the courts.99 Therefore, a requirement to wait for the Register to 
process a claim prior to filing suit is superfluous and runs counter to 
the purpose of copyright law.100 
                                                                                                             
 96. Section 411(a) of the Copyright Act provides: 
[Once] the deposit, application, and fee required for registration have been delivered 
to the Copyright Office in proper form and registration has been refused, the 
applicant is entitled to institute a civil action for infringement if notice thereof, with a 
copy of the complaint, is served on the Register of Copyrights. 
17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018). 
 97. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 7.16(B)(3)(a) (“[I]t makes sense under the 1976 Act 
to refer to application for registration as a condition to filing an infringement action . . . .”). 
 98. See, e.g., Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 620 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting 
that “affirmative approval or rejection before suit thus amounts to little more than just the type of 
needless formality Congress generally worked to eliminate in the 1976 Act”); Shira Perlmutter, Freeing 
Copyright from Formalities, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 565, 566 (1993) (“In the 1976 Act, 
Congress began the journey toward eliminating formalities from our copyright law.”). 
 99. See, e.g., Bartok v. Boosey & Hawkes, Inc., 523 F.2d 941, 946 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting “the 
Copyright Office has no authority to give opinions or define legal terms”); Darden v. Peters, 402 F. 
Supp. 2d 638, 641 (E.D.N.C. 2005), aff’d, 488 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating that “copyrightability is 
a question of law reserved to the judge and subject to de novo review by appellate courts”). 
 100. Article I, Section Eight of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the 
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive 
right to their respective writings and discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE, GENERAL GUIDE TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976, at 1:1 (1977), 
https://www.copyright.gov/reports/guide-to-copyright.pdf [https://perma.cc/666P-BVJC] [hereinafter 
GENERAL GUIDE TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976] (observing that “the primary purpose of copyright 
20
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Furthermore, adherence to the registration approach risks that the 
three-year statute of limitations for copyright infringement could 
expire while an owner waits for the Copyright Office to process her 
registration claim.101 Processing a registration can take several 
months, if not years.102 This delay can have severe limitations on the 
relief that American authors are able to obtain. Though the time 
could be cut significantly shorter by filing for “special handling” with 
the Copyright Office, this expedited form of registration costs 
hundreds of dollars more than regular registration, is not available for 
all works, and has no guaranteed turnaround time.103 Congress would 
not have provided a means to file suit even after denial of registration 
if it intended to leave copyright owners in this “legal limbo” while 
waiting for the Copyright Office to decide on their application.104 
II.   The Supreme Court Adopts the Registration Approach 
In 2017, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the registration approach via 
Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC.105 In 
response to this ruling, Fourth Estate filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari with the Supreme Court on October 13, 2017.106 The 
                                                                                                             
legislation is to foster the creation and dissemination of intellectual works for the public welfare; an 
important secondary purpose is to give creators the reward due them for their contribution to society”). 
 101. See 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2018). 
 102. Registration Processing Times, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 
https://www.copyright.gov/registration/docs/processing-times-faqs.pdf [https://perma.cc/392F-ZK3E] 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2020) (stating that registration of a copyright claim can take an average of six 
months to twenty months). The Copyright Office can take as long as thirty-seven months to decide on a 
claim. Id.; see also Kaplan, supra note 10 (“[In November 2017] the Copyright Office advise[d] that the 
registration process takes about six to eight months using its electronic registration system, and about 
eight to [ten] months for hard-copy registrations.”). 
 103. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 10 SPECIAL HANDLING 1–2 (2017), 
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ10.pdf [hereinafter SPECIAL HANDLING]. Special handling costs 
$800 per work and has an estimated, but not guaranteed, turnaround time of five days. Id. at 2; see also 
Kaplan, supra note 10 (“Copyright owners have the ability to expedite the registration process with an 
expedited review taking five to fifteen days. But, it costs $800 per work.”). Due to the expense in the 
expedited special handing offered by the Copyright Office, one commentator observes “copyright 
owners are likely to favor the application approach over the registration approach from a flexibility and 
cost-savings standpoint.” Kaplan, supra note 10. 
 104. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 7.16(B)(3)(b)(ii). 
 105. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 856 F.3d 1338, 1341 (11th Cir. 
2017), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019). 
 106. Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, SCOTUSBLOG, 
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/fourth-estate-public-benefit-corp-v-wall-street-com/ 
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Supreme Court granted certiorari on June 28, 2018, and heard oral 
arguments on January 8, 2019.107 The arguments focused on the plain 
text of the statute and policy concerns surrounding the registration 
requirement.108 
In a unanimous decision, the Court held “registration occurs, and a 
copyright claimant may commence an infringement suit, when the 
Copyright Office registers a copyright.”109 As such, the Court 
rejected the application approach, finding instead that the registration 
approach “reflects the only satisfactory reading of § 411(a)’s text.”110 
Delivering the opinion for the Court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
clarified that “a copyright owner can recover for infringement that 
occurred both before and after registration.”111 
A.   The Plain Text of the Copyright Act 
First, looking to the statute’s text, the Court concluded that, when 
read together, the three sentences comprising § 411(a) require an 
affirmative action by the Register rather than the claimant’s act of 
simply applying for registration.112 Justice Ginsburg noted the 
section’s second sentence allowing lawsuits when a registration claim 
is refused “would be superfluous” if “registration” is the copyright 
                                                                                                             
[https://perma.cc/7JLB-54BJ] (last visited Mar. 9, 2020). 
 107. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 2707, 2707 (2018) (mem.); 
Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, supra note 106.  
 108. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, 3, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881 
(No.17-571). In addition to the petitioner and respondent, the United States argued in support of 
respondent. Id. at 1. 
 109. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 886. 
 110. Id. at 888. 
 111. Id. at 886–87 (emphasis added). Though Justice Ginsburg did not attend the oral argument 
because she was home recovering from lung cancer surgery, she wrote her opinion based on the oral 
argument transcript and briefs. Jon Levitan & Andrew Hamm, Case Study on the Ginsburg Conspiracy 
Theories in Action, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 15, 2019, 11:37 AM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/03/case-study-on-the-ginsburg-conspiracy-theories-in-action/ 
[https://perma.cc/5DHY-U3L9]; Jessica Litman, Opinion Analysis: A Copyright Owner Can’t Sue for 
Infringement Before the Register Has Processed Its Copyright Registration Application, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Mar. 4, 2019, 5:41 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/03/opinion-analysis-a-copyright-owner-
cant-sue-for-infringement-before-the-register-has-processed-its-copyright-registration-application/ 
[https://perma.cc/J2T7-6MDL]. 
 112. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 888–89 (“[Section] 411(a)’s opening sentences 
focus not on the claimant’s act of applying for registration, but on action by the Copyright          
Office—namely, it’s registration or refusal to register a copyright claim.”). 
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owner’s act of filing an application rather than the Register’s act of 
reviewing the application.113 As such, the Court resisted the 
“implausible assumption that Congress gave ‘registration’ different 
meanings in consecutive, related sentences within a single statutory 
provision.”114 
Further, Justice Ginsburg pointed to other sections of the 
Copyright Act to support the proposition that “registration” requires 
actions by the Register.115 For instance, § 410(a) provides “after 
examination . . . the Register shall register the claim and issue to the 
applicant a certificate of registration . . . .”116 Section 410 also 
permits the Register to refuse registration.117 Therefore, Justice 
Ginsburg concluded that § 410 “confirms that application is discrete 
from, and precedes, registration.”118 Lastly, the Court pointed to 
§ 408(f)’s preregistration option for authors of works that are 
“vulnerable to predistribution infringement.”119 The Court reasoned 
that preregistration would be a pointless provision if one were 
permitted to file suit after merely completing an application for 
registration.120 
B.   Policy Concerns Relating to Registration Delay 
As of this writing, the Copyright Office takes an average of six 
months to process a registration claim.121 Even still, processing times 
can be significantly longer—sometimes taking nearly two years to 
register a claim.122 Recognizing that “delay” was a major policy 
concern for proponents of the application approach, Justice Brett 
                                                                                                             
 113. Id. at 889. 
 114. Id. (citing Mid-Con Freight Sys., Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 440, 448 (2005)). 
 115. Id. 
 116. 17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (2018). 
 117. Id. § 410(b). 
 118. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 889. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com, COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE, 
https://copyrightalliance.org/copyright-law/copyright-cases/fourth-estate-v-wall-street-com/ 
[https://perma.cc/ULT2-PHFR] (last visited Mar. 9, 2020). 
 122. Registration Processing Times, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 
https://www.copyright.gov/registration/docs/processing-times-faqs.pdf [https://perma.cc/FC9D-MQEK] 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2020); see also supra text accompanying note 95. 
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Kavanaugh pressed Aaron Panner (counsel for Fourth Estate) to 
explain the “practical problems” with the registration approach.123 
Stating, “[T]he most severe practical problem is the inability to 
receive prompt injunctive relief,” Mr. Panner detailed a hypothetical 
in which an infringed song is distributed over the Internet and is “so 
widely disseminated that its value for the author has been lost.”124 
In addition to potential losses in value, Fourth Estate raised 
concerns that the lag time between filing an application and receiving 
the Register’s determination may cost a copyright owner the ability 
to enforce her rights.125 Nevertheless, the Court found the fear that 
the statute of limitations may run before the Copyright Office acts on 
the registration application was “overstated.”126 Justice Ginsburg 
suggested that the average processing time leaves “ample time to sue 
after the Register’s decision,” regardless of whether the infringement 
began before the copyright owner submitted his application for 
registration.127 Additionally, the Court rightly points out that 
copyright owners can choose expedited processing for an additional 
fee in situations involving “[p]ending or prospective litigation.”128 
Nevertheless, though the Copyright Office “make[s] every attempt to 
examine the [expedited] application . . . within five working days[,]” 
there is no guarantee that the Register will decide on the application 
in an accelerated fashion.129 Echoing Justice Kavanaugh’s concerns 
at oral argument regarding administrative delays, Justice Ginsburg 
recognized that it is an “unfortunate” reality that such delays may 
prevent a copyright owner from enforcing his rights.130 Ultimately, 
however, the Court did not find this argument persuasive and held 
                                                                                                             
 123. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 108, at 25. 
 124. Brief for the Petitioner at 2, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. 881 (No. 17-571); 
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 108, at 25. 
 125. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 124, at 41 (citing Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. 
IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 620 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
 126. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 892. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 892 n.6 (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE 
PRACTICES § 623.2 (3d ed. 2017) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM (THIRD)]); see also SPECIAL HANDLING 
supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 129. COMPENDIUM (THIRD), supra note 128, § 623.4; see SPECIAL HANDLING, supra note 103, at 2.  
 130. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 892. 
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that it has no bearing on the text of the statute as written by 
Congress.131 Accordingly, the Court held registration occurs “when 
the Register has registered a copyright after examining a properly 
filed application[,]” thereby putting § 411(a)’s inconsistent circuit 
readings to rest.132 
III.   The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works 
In contrast to the United States, the rest of the world has long 
decided the copyright registration issue.133 Although registration is a 
nonessential formality under the Berne Convention, several Berne 
member countries have voluntary registration systems; however, 
registration is often not required for a copyright owner to exercise her 
rights.134 This lack of a registration requirement creates a disparity 
between what is required for an American author to sue for copyright 
infringement in the United States versus what is required for a 
foreign author to do the same.135 
                                                                                                             
 131. Id. (noting “the current administrative lag . . . does not allow [the Court] to revise § 411(a)’s 
congressionally composed text”). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Berne Convention, supra note 13 (eliminating formalities under the Berne Convention). The 
World Intellectual Property Organization explains: 
Before the 1886 Berne Convention, each country had its own rules for recognition of 
copyright in a work. Consequently, authors had to comply with formalities on a 
country-by-country basis. The Berne Convention introduced the principle that authors 
in Union countries need only comply with the formalities imposed by the country of 
origin of a work. This rule was replaced in the 1908 Berlin revision of the Convention 
by the current principle of formality-free protection, reflected in Article 5(2) of the 
present Paris Act 1971, according to which the enjoyment and the exercise of 
copyright shall not be subject to any formality. 
Copyright Registration and Documentation Systems, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/activities/copyright_registration/index.html [https://perma.cc/JM9P-
ENY2] (last visited Mar. 9, 2020) [hereinafter Copyright Registration and Documentation Systems]. 
 134. Copyright Registration and Documentation Systems, supra note 133 (observing that “several 
Berne Union members have established voluntary national registration systems for copyright and 
sometimes also for related rights”); see also JOHN TEHRANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0 
AND YOU 108 (2011) (noting that two countries with legal systems similar to ours do not require 
copyright registration—the United Kingdom has no registration system and Canada lacks a registration 
requirement to enforce the copyright owner’s rights). 
 135. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018) (stating that “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in 
any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has 
been made”); see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, § 3.15 (noting that § 411(a) “exempt[s] qualified 
foreign works from the requirement of registration as a condition to suit”). 
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A.   The Berne Convention and Registration as a Nonessential 
Formality 
The international nature of copyright law in today’s world cannot 
be overestimated, nor should it be overlooked.136 Foreign markets 
account for over forty percent of the United States’ copyright 
revenue.137 Moreover, foreign and international copyright has never 
been as prominent a subject as it is today.138 As a result of this focus, 
the Berne Convention has emerged as the governing instrument of 
international copyright law.139 “With U.S. accession to the Berne 
[C]onvention in 1989, . . . ‘internationalization [has become] an 
integral component of U.S. copyright lawmaking.’”140 
1.   A Brief History of the Berne Convention 
The Berne Convention of 1886 was borne from nearly three 
decades of conferences and studies dating back to the Congress of 
Authors and Artists in Brussels, Belgium.141 Ralph Oman, former 
Register of Copyrights, observed that “[b]y this time, several 
countries had already undertaken individual efforts to protect the 
works of foreign authors on the basis of reciprocity.”142 After several 
European congresses were held in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, the delegates of the 1878 Literary Congress (held in Paris 
under the leadership of Victor Hugo) created the International 
                                                                                                             
 136. 5 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 17.01 (Matthew Bender 
rev. ed. 2018) (“In decades past, an American copyright practitioner could wind up a career that 
included only fleeting encounters with foreign and international copyright. No longer is that isolation 
possible—the world is upon us, just as we are actively exploiting our copyrights worldwide.”). 
 137. Id. § 17.01 n.2 (quoting Hearings on GATT Intellectual Property Provision (Statement of 
MPAA)). 
 138. See id. § 17.01 (noting that the internationalization of copyright law “arguably eclipses in 
importance all else in the copyright world”). 
 139. Id.; see also Deborah Ross, Comment, The United States Joins the Berne Convention: New 
Obligations for Authors’ Moral Rights, 68 N.C. L. REV. 363, 363 n.2 (1990) (observing that “[t]he 
Berne Convention is the oldest and most comprehensive copyright treaty in the world”). 
 140. 5 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 136 (quoting Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: 
Why National Courts Should Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 483 (2000)). 
 141. David Ladd, To Cope with the World Upheaval in Copyright, 19 COPYRIGHT 289, 290 (1983). 
 142. Ralph Oman, The United States and the Berne Union: An Extended Courtship, 3 J.L. & TECH. 
71, 72 (1988). 
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Literary Association.143 The Association intended to create an 
international copyright union and held a conference in Berne, 
Switzerland in 1883 to begin drafting a constitution.144 This first 
conference created a twenty-one-article draft, which was later 
amended and approved by a second conference in 1886.145 Though 
Berne “was an ‘open convention,’” the United States did not assent to 
the union.146 In fact, due to incompatibilities with Berne 
requirements, the United States refrained from joining the Berne 
Convention for over a century—finally acceding in 1989 with the 
codification of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988.147 
                                                                                                             
 143. Id. Victor Hugo was a nineteenth century French author whose seminal works include The 
Hunchback of Notre Dame and Les Miserables. Hugo, Victor Marie, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 856 (5th ed. 2011). 
 144. AUBERT J. CLARK, THE MOVEMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT IN NINETEENTH CENTURY 
AMERICA 134 (1960); see also Oman, supra note 142. 
 145. CLARK, supra note 144, at 135. 
Fifty-five nations were invited to sign. The final protocol was signed by Belgium, 
France, Germany, Great Britain, Haiti, Italy, Liberia, Spain, Switzerland, and Tunis 
on September 8, 1886. France, Great Britain and Spain specifically included their 
colonies and possessions under their signatures, which then meant that a large part of 
the civilized world had adhered to the convention. Ratifications were exchanged 
September 5, 1887, and the Berne Convention went into effect on December 5, 1887. 
Id. 
 146. Id. at 136. The United States’ holdout from the Berne Convention was criticized by members of 
the nineteenth-century literary community, including a committee member of the American Copyright 
League and editor of The Century Magazine named Richard Watson Gilder. Id. In an article released at 
the time the Berne Convention went into effect, Gilder stated: 
Another reason for prompt action lies in the fact that during the past year the rest of 
the civilized world has put the seal of shame upon us anew by uniting, at the Berne 
Copyright Conference, in an international arrangement which is at once the most 
definite recognition and complete protection of literary property in existence. From 
this honorable compact the United States Government alone [sic] has excluded 
itself. . . . 
THE CENTURY CO., THE CENTURY ILLUSTRATED MONTHLY MAGAZINE, NOVEMBER 1886 TO APRIL 
1887, at 490 (1887). 
 147. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988) 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018)); AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI., MODERN COPYRIGHT 
FUNDAMENTALS: KEY WRITINGS ON TECHNICAL AND OTHER ISSUES 445 (Ben H. Weil & Barbara 
Friedman Polansky eds., American Society for Information Science 1989) (1985) [hereinafter MODERN 
COPYRIGHT FUNDAMENTALS] (“In October 1988, Congress finally passed the [Berne Convention 
Implementation Act of 1988], and the Senate ratified the Berne treaty, effective in early 1989.”); see 
also Ross, supra note 139, at 363 (observing that “[s]ome commentators have hesitated to advocate 
[U.S.] membership [in Berne] because several aspects of American copyright law were incompatible 
with Berne”). 
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Currently, 177 of the world’s 195 countries are parties to the Berne 
Convention.148 
2.   Registration Is a Nonessential Formality Under the Berne 
Convention 
One of the main principles of the Berne Convention is the 
elimination of several formalities that were normally required to 
enforce copyright protection.149 The Convention states that no 
formality shall limit “[t]he enjoyment and the exercise” of a 
copyright owner’s exclusive rights.150 This lack of formalities is one 
of the major features that kept the United States from joining the 
Berne Convention for over a century.151 
The Copyright Office views § 411’s registration requirement as a 
permitted formality.152 However, prior to becoming a signatory to the 
Berne Convention, the United States Congress had “different views 
as to whether the registration requirement was a formality prohibited 
by the Berne Convention.”153 Nonetheless, Congress eventually 
amended the Copyright Act to eliminate registration as a prerequisite 
for Berne Convention claimants while continuing to require United 
States claimants to register prior to filing suit.154 As a result, the 
                                                                                                             
 148. INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT RELATIONS OF U.S., supra note 14, at 4; WIPO-Administered 
Treaties: Contracting Parties, Berne Convention, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=15 [https://perma.cc/MSC4-KQ8W] (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2020); see La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1205 
(10th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010) 
(recognizing that the Berne Convention “is adhered to by much of the global community”). 
 149. La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1205 (“The Berne Convention eliminates most, if not all, 
formalities that are required to obtain and enforce copyrights.”); BERNE CONVENTION BASICS, supra 
note 12 (“Under Berne, no formalities are required as preconditions to protection.”); MODERN 
COPYRIGHT FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 147 (noting that the Berne Convention requires the “removal 
of formalities”). 
 150. Berne Convention, supra note 13. 
 151. Jon A. Baumgarten & Charles W. Lieb, 68: Trademarks and Copyrights, in MODERN 
COPYRIGHT FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 147, at 399–400. 
 152. Oman, supra note 142, at 85 (“Registration and recordation as a prerequisite to an infringement 
suit, in the view of the Copyright Office, are also permissible formalities . . . .”). 
 153. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, § 3.15. 
 154. 17 U.S.C. § 411 (1988) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2018)) (upholding the registration 
requirement “[e]xcept for actions for infringement of copyright in Berne Convention works whose 
country of origin is not the United States . . .”); La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1202–04 (quoting 
134 CONG. REC. 10,095 (1988)) (“Registration is continued as a prerequisite to suit by domestic authors. 
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United States is the only major country that requires any form of 
registration to obtain relief for copyright infringement.155 
B.   America and the Berne Convention: Two Systems in 
Disharmony 
In contrast to the American copyright scheme, which has long held 
formalities to be essential to copyright protection, the Berne 
Convention provides that copyright protection does not require 
formalities such as registration.156 Regardless, by becoming a 
signatory to the Berne Convention in 1989, the United States 
loosened its system of formalities in order to comply with Berne’s 
                                                                                                             
Only foreign origin works are excepted from the registration requirement.”). Though the Berne 
Convention language has since been deleted from § 411, the Copyright Act continues to provide that 
any “United States work” must be registered or preregistered prior to filing a “civil action for 
infringement.” 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2018). The Copyright Act defines a “United States work” as: 
(1) in the case of a published work, the work is first published— 
(A) in the United States; 
(B) simultaneously in the United States and another treaty party or parties, whose 
law grants a term of copyright protection that is the same as or longer than the term 
provided in the United States; 
(C) simultaneously in the United States and a foreign nation that is not a treaty 
party; or 
(D) in a foreign nation that is not a treaty party, and all of the authors of the work 
are nationals, domiciliaries, or habitual residents of, or in the case of an audiovisual 
work legal entities with headquarters in, the United States; 
(2) in the case of an unpublished work, all the authors of the work are nationals, 
domiciliaries, or habitual residents of the United States, or, in the case of an 
unpublished audiovisual work, all the authors are legal entities with headquarters in 
the United States; or 
(3) in the case of a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work incorporated in a building or 
structure, the building or structure is located in the United States. 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
 155. MODERN COPYRIGHT FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 147 (“Mandatory registration as a 
precondition to lawsuits is now required only for domestic works . . .”); TEHRANIAN, supra note 134, at 
98 (“[T]he United States is the only major country in the world with a timely registration prerequisite for 
the recovery . . . . In other countries, full legal vindication of one’s exclusive rights does not require the 
added procedure of registration, let alone timely registration.”). 
 156. Berne Convention, supra note 13 (eliminating formalities as a requisite to copyright protection); 
see Perlmutter, supra note 98 (observing that “[s]ince its eighteenth-century origins, [U.S.] law has 
required various steps to be taken in order to obtain and enjoy federal copyright protection”); Barbara 
Friedman Polansky, International Recommendations for Handling Copyright Questions About 
Computer-Generated Works: What Are Our Concerns?, 23 J. CHEMICAL INFO. COMPUTER SCI. 168, 168 
(1983) (“Nations that belong to the Berne Union do not have required copyright formalities and have the 
minimum standards of copyright protection.”); 5 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 136, § 17.04(B)(3)(a) 
(“Berne permits no formalities as a condition to copyright protection outside the country of origin.”). 
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prohibition of the same.157 For example, the United States eliminated 
the notice requirement in § 401 of the Copyright Act, instead making 
notice optional.158 In fact, Shira Perlmutter—the Chief Policy Officer 
and Director for International Affairs at the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office—has noted “[t]he major change in formalities 
accomplished by the Berne Convention Implementation Act was the 
repeal of the notice requirement.”159 However, certain formalities are 
still required to enjoy the full weight of the copyright protections 
offered by the American system.160 The issue of registration 
exemplifies this contrasting view of formalities between the 
American and Berne Convention.161 
One of the Berne Convention’s main objectives was to create a 
“national treatment.”162 This means “works originating in a member 
state receive the same treatment whether the author is domestic or a 
foreign national.”163 Therefore, rights that are made available to 
American copyright owners under the Copyright Act must also be 
made available to copyright owners who are citizens of another 
Berne Convention country.164 Consider statutory damages as an 
                                                                                                             
 157. See Michael Landau, Fitting United States Copyright Law into the International Scheme: 
Foreign and Domestic Challenges to Recent Legislation, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 847, 867 (2007) (noting 
that formalities were either “relaxed or eliminated” when the United States became a member of the 
Berne Convention). 
 158. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 2853, 2857–59. However, one 
commentator has observed that there are still incentives for placing notice on a copyrighted work, such 
as (1) protection against a defendant claiming to be an “innocent infringer,” (2) a cause of action under 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act against a defendant “who removes ‘copyright management 
information’ from a work,” and (3) informing the world of ownership. Landau, supra note 157. 
 159. Perlmutter, supra note 98, at 569–70. For Ms. Perlmutter’s biography, see Shira Perlmutter, 
USPTO (Jan. 13, 2012, 12:20 PM), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/executive-biographies/shira-
perlmutter [https://perma.cc/4JQ8-QTV3]. 
 160. See Perlmutter, supra note 98 (“[W]hile most traditional formalities have been eliminated, some 
vestiges remain.”). 
 161. Oman, supra note 142, at 84 (“The present registration system, while generally permissive, has 
retained its vitality under the current Copyright Act because of its clear benefits and certain inducements 
to make registration.”); see also Perlmutter, supra note 98 (demonstrating that 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) 
provides that Berne country works, other than United States works, are no longer required to register 
prior to filing suit for copyright infringement). 
 162. 5 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 136, § 17.01(B)(1)(a); Oman, supra note 142; Ross, supra 
note 139, at 365. 
 163. BERNE CONVENTION BASICS, supra note 12; see also 5 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 136, 
§ 17.04 (defining “national treatment” as affording foreigners “equality of protection with the state’s 
own nationals”). 
 164. See 5 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 136, § 17.01(B)(1)(a). 
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example of the national treatment afforded to Berne claimants in the 
United States.165 Statutory damages are a remedy that may be denied 
to all plaintiffs in an infringement suit, regardless of the plaintiff’s 
nation of origin. However, because they are afforded to American 
authors, statutory damages must also be extended to foreign authors 
so as to not impinge on Berne’s national treatment rule.166 This 
adherence to the concept of national treatment is an example of when 
the international system works in harmony between different member 
countries. 
The Berne Convention’s prohibition of formalities bars those that 
have an effect on the copyright owner’s “enjoyment and [] exercise” 
of his rights.167 Therefore, the question is whether the formality of a 
registration requirement so limits a copyright owner’s ability to 
obtain relief that it impermissibly hinders that owner’s enjoyment 
and exercise. As stated above, § 412 of the Copyright Act requires all 
claimants—regardless of their nation of origin—to register the 
copyright at issue in order to obtain statutory damages.168 However, 
though “Berne may not ban a copyright registration system that 
serves a procedural end,” one critic opines that the remedy’s 
registration requirement runs afoul of Berne’s formalities 
prohibition.169 This discrepancy comes from the bar on substantive 
rights to American authors absent registration. 
                                                                                                             
 165. Section 412 of the Copyright Act provides that registration is a prerequisite to receive statutory 
damages. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2018). 
 166. 5 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 136, § 17.01(B)(1)(a). Nimmer posits that by affording 
foreign Berne authors the right to seek statutory damages, “the United States has exceeded the Berne 
minima as to remedies.” Id. 
 167. Berne Convention, supra note 13. 
 168. 17 U.S.C. § 412. 
 169. TEHRANIAN, supra note 134, at 115 (“[Berne’s] language appears to render suspect any 
copyright registration system that affects substantive rights, including significant remedies.”). On the 
other hand, the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention concluded that 
§ 412 complies with the Berne Convention because it affects specific remedies rather than eliminating 
the ability to obtain relief at all. Id. (citing FINAL REPORT OF THE AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON U.S. 
ADHERENCE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION, reprinted in 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 513 (1986)). The 
Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention was put together by the United 
States Department of State and made up of Copyright Office staff members, legal scholars, and 
copyright attorneys. Id.; Ross, supra note 139. Its purpose was to advise Congress on the necessary 
changes to American copyright law required to comply with the Berne Convention. Id. Nimmer further 
provides “Berne imposes a condition that copyright subsistence for works emanating from other 
member states may not be premised on formal requirements. It does not, however, prohibit formalities 
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Congress passed the Berne Convention Implementation Act to 
comply with the Berne Convention’s provisions, including the 
prohibition of formalities.170 In doing so, Congress eliminated the 
presuit registration requirement for Berne Convention works.171 
However, the requirement is still intact for United States works and 
those from non-Berne Convention countries.172 As Shira Perlmutter 
has noted, while eliminating the presuit registration requirement for 
Berne member countries “may satisfy our Berne obligations, the 
result is to disadvantage U.S. copyright owners relative to their 
counterparts from our chief trading partners.”173 This treatment both 
inconveniences American authors and puts them at a financial 
disadvantage compared to their foreign counterparts.174 
Under the current American copyright scheme, foreign authors are 
afforded quicker and cheaper access to relief than American authors. 
The lack of a registration requirement for foreign authors allows 
them to file suit immediately upon learning of an alleged 
infringement. In contrast, American authors must comply with the 
registration requirements under § 408, pay the registration fee, and 
wait for the Copyright Office to receive the application materials. 
Had the Supreme Court adopted the application approach in Fourth 
Estate, the American copyright owner could file suit at this point. 
                                                                                                             
as a condition to certain types of remedies, licenses, exemptions, etc.” 5 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 
136, § 17.01(B)(1)(a); see also Perlmutter, supra note 98, at 570 (explaining that “restricting remedies is 
not inconsistent with Berne’s prohibition on formalities, because it does not prevent ‘the enjoyment or 
exercise’ of rights”). 
 170. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 1 (1988). 
 171. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1988) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018)). 
 172. Id.; see also Perlmutter, supra note 98, at 570. 
 173. Perlmutter, supra note 98, at 572. 
 174. Id. at 572–73 (“[O]ne U.S. software company testified that it spent hundreds of thousands of 
dollars a year preparing applications for registration—an expenditure not necessary for its foreign 
competitors.”). Perlmutter further explains: 
The provision of benefits only to works from outside a Berne member’s borders is an 
odd twist in Berne’s history. The Convention was written to achieve a satisfactory 
minimum level of rights around the world, while barring discrimination against 
foreign works through the principle of national treatment. Although a member is free 
to be more stingy with its own works, such an approach undercuts the goal of 
worldwide minimum rights. 
Id. at 572 n.41. 
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held the registration approach is 
the better reading of the Copyright Act.175 As such, American authors 
in all circuits must additionally wait for the Copyright Office to 
decide on their application before they are allowed to file suit. Due to 
the severe delays associated with the registration approach, American 
authors must live with the risk that the three-year statute of 
limitations for copyright infringement will expire while they wait for 
the Copyright Office to decide on their application.176 Though they 
could pay the $800 special handling fee to expedite their 
applications, this additional, nonstatutory step puts American authors 
at a further disadvantage as it will cost them hundreds of dollars 
more—if not thousands for the registration of multiple works—than 
Berne authors simply to register their works so that they are able to 
enforce their exclusive rights.177 
IV.   Proposal 
Formalities have largely impacted American copyright law since 
the first Copyright Act was enacted in 1790.178 Unfortunately, though 
the relaxation of formalities was a goal of the current Copyright Act, 
certain formalities remain.179 Indeed, the registration formality 
“provides the key to the courthouse” for infringement suits.180 
However, the current statutory scheme governing registration is 
ambiguous.181 Moreover, regardless of the Supreme Court’s 
                                                                                                             
 175. See supra Part II. 
 176. See 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2018). 
 177. See SPECIAL HANDLING, supra note 103, at 2. 
 178. See GENERAL GUIDE TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976, supra note 100 (noting “[t]he first federal 
copyright statute was enacted in 1790”); Oman, supra note 142, at 82 (explaining that “[f]ormalities 
have played an important role in United States copyright law”). As an example of the prevalence of 
formalities in U.S. history, one former Register of Copyrights observes that, prior the joining Berne, 
“[n]otice ha[d] been a requirement of United States copyright law since 1790, and the requirement that 
such notice be placed on published copies has been in the law since 1802.” Id. 
 179. GENERAL GUIDE TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976, supra note 100, at A1:6 (stating that 
formalities have been “relaxed” under the current Copyright Act); see also Matthew P. Gelfand, A 
Perfect (Copyright) Union: Uniting Registration and License Designation, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 711, 
713 (2012) (“Although formalities once operated to substantially limit the number of works protected by 
copyright law, they have been relegated to an inferior status over time. Today, they operate only to limit 
enhanced damages or prevent certain evidentiary presumptions.”). 
 180. Boyd, supra note 56, at 499. 
 181. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 618 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding the 
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endorsement of the registration approach, the United States remains 
out of step with the majority of the world, which holds that 
registration and other formalities shall not impede the copyright 
owner’s “enjoyment and [] exercise” of her exclusive rights.182 
Accordingly, Congress should eliminate § 411’s registration 
requirement so that American authors receive the same opportunities 
for relief as their foreign counterparts from Berne Convention 
countries. 
A.   The Application Approach Best Supports U.S. Copyright 
Law’s Statutory Scheme 
Contrary to the Supreme Court’s Fourth Estate holding, the 
application approach best protects copyright owners’ exclusive 
statutory rights. First, the application approach better comports with 
the purpose of the Copyright Act. Unlike a patent, which does not 
exist until the United States Patent and Trademark Office issues it 
after analyzing the application for multiple factors, a copyright arises 
automatically.183 Copyright merely requires a low bar of originality 
and fixation in a tangible medium.184 Registration with the Copyright 
Office is not required to obtain the exclusive rights afforded to the 
copyright owner. Even still, registration should be encouraged, and 
both approaches continue to require registration prior to filing suit. 
However, putting registration in the hands of the applicant rather than 
those of the Register supports adherence to the application approach 
while continuing to encourage registration. 
Next, the application approach will prevent the legal limbo in 
which litigants may find themselves if they do not already hold a 
registration certificate at the time they learn of an infringement.185 As 
                                                                                                             
Copyright Act’s plain language ambiguous). 
 182. Berne Convention, supra note 13. 
 183. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018); see 35 U.S.C. §§ 111–123 (2018) (detailing the requirements for a 
patent application). 
 184. Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (stating that copyright 
permits any work that is “independently created by the author” and possesses “at least some minimal 
degree of creativity”). 
 185. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 620 (“The application approach avoids this legal limbo—and avoids 
prolonging the period of infringement—by allowing a litigant to proceed with an infringement suit as 
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previously noted, it is common for the Copyright Office to take 
months, sometimes years, to perform its administrative functions and 
issue a certificate of registration.186 The high volume of registration 
claims the Copyright Office receives each year makes its task 
particularly daunting.187 It is unreasonable to make a potential litigant 
wait for as much as two years before allowing him to file suit simply 
because of backlog at the Copyright Office. Additionally, the 
three-year statute of limitations for copyright infringement suits will 
expire on at least some potential plaintiffs, thereby preventing them 
from obtaining relief.188 Further, for those litigants who remain 
within the statute of limitations, a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim will merely delay the suit while wasting judicial 
resources as the plaintiff will simply refile her suit once she has the 
registration certificate in hand.189 
Moreover, neither approach frustrates the overall purpose of 
copyright registration. When making registration voluntary, Congress 
left certain incentives in the Copyright Act to encourage registration 
to create a “robust national register of copyrights.”190 In fact, within 
Congress’s goal of relaxing formalities, it acknowledged that 
“[c]opyright registration for published works, which is useful and 
important to users and the public at large . . . should . . . be induced in 
some practical way.”191 Adherence to the application approach would 
have no bearing on this overall goal. Both approaches require that the 
copyright owner file a completed application, deposit, and fee with 
the Copyright Office.192 These materials can be used to create a 
healthy national library of copyrights regardless of whether the 
                                                                                                             
soon as he has taken all of the necessary steps to register the copyright at issue.”). 
 186. See supra notes 34, 95 and accompanying text. 
 187. See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text. 
 188. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2018). 
 189. Int’l Kitchen Exhaust Cleaning Ass’n v. Power Washers of N. Am., 81 F. Supp. 2d 70, 72 
(D.D.C. 2000) (adopting the application approach because it “best effectuate[s] the interests of justice 
and promote[s] judicial economy”). See generally Kaplan, supra note 10 (observing “copyright owners 
are likely to favor the application approach over the registration approach from a flexibility and 
cost-savings standpoint”). 
 190. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 620. 
 191. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 158 (1976). 
 192. See 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2018). 
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applicant filed a suit for infringement before or after issuance of a 
registration certificate. Additionally, copyright owners are further 
incentivized to register their works with the Copyright Office in order 
to take advantage of §§ 504 and 505, which allow a plaintiff to 
receive statutory damages and attorney’s fees.193 Statutory damages 
do not require the plaintiff to show actual damages and can be as 
much as $30,000 per work infringed.194 When coupled with the 
opportunity to also receive costs and attorney’s fees, these two 
sections of the Copyright Act maintain a lucrative incentive for 
copyright owners to voluntarily register their works. 
Finally, in holding for the registration approach, the Supreme 
Court ensures that authors of United States works remain on unequal 
footing with foreign authors from Berne Convention member 
countries. Currently, foreign authors are exempt from § 411’s 
registration requirement while American authors are bound by it.195 
As a result, foreign authors have cheaper, quicker, and less 
burdensome access to the United States judicial system than 
America’s own citizens.196 Adoption of the application approach 
eliminates the additional burden that Americans experience when 
filing an infringement suit. With registration costing $35 to as much 
as $800 per work, it is easy to see how expensive registration can 
become.197 This is especially true when the claimant is litigating the 
infringement of multiple works. Had the Justices adopted the 
application approach, American authors could avoid filing special 
handling applications, thereby minimizing some of the additional 
expense seen in suits that are close to being barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
                                                                                                             
 193. Id. §§ 504–505 (2018). 
 194. Id. § 504. 
 195. Id. § 411 (2018). 
 196. See Landau, supra note 157, at 869 n.84 (“The Berne Convention . . . provides reciprocal 
protection and access to the courts to signatory countries.”). 
 197. Fees, COPYRIGHT.GOV, https://www.copyright.gov/about/fees.html [https://perma.cc/7V5S-
3WDF] (last visited Mar. 9, 2020); see also SPECIAL HANDLING, supra note 103, at 2. 
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B.   Elimination of the Registration Requirement Under § 411 
Regardless of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Estate holding, 
Congress should go one step further and entirely eliminate the 
requirement to register a copyright prior to filing suit for 
infringement. This elimination would further harmonize the 
American and Berne Convention copyright schemes relating to 
formalities. For example, consider an infringement suit between an 
American and Canadian. Unlike the United States, Canada does not 
have a copyright registration requirement—making registration truly 
voluntary.198 Under the current American copyright scheme, if an 
American author were to file a copyright infringement suit in 
Canada, Berne’s reciprocal protection would require her to register 
her work in Canada prior to bringing suit.199 This holds true because 
her home country (the United States) requires registration prior to 
filing suit, and she must comply with her home country’s laws when 
suing for infringement abroad. If we take the flipside of that scenario 
and have the Canadian suing for infringement in the United States, 
the Canadian author would not be required to register his 
copyright.200 
                                                                                                             
 198. TEHRANIAN, supra note 134. Though registration is not required in Canada, the Canadian 
Intellectual Property Office points out that “a certificate of registration of copyright is evidence that 
copyright exists and that the person registered is the owner of the copyright.” A Guide to Copyright, 
CANADIAN INTELL. PROP. OFF., https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-
internetopic.nsf/eng/h_wr02281.html#benefitsRegistration [https://perma.cc/Z3DW-UJ5K] (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2020). The Canadian Copyright Office does have certain limitations, however, continuing that 
“the Copyright Office is not responsible for policing or checking on registered works and how people 
use them.” Id. The Canadian Copyright Office “also cannot guarantee that the legitimacy of ownership 
or the originality of a work will never be questioned.” Id. 
 199. One case explains reciprocal protection in treaties as follows: 
The central thrust of these multilateral treaties is the principle of “national treatment.” 
A work of an American national first generated in America will receive the same 
protection in a foreign nation as that country accords to the works of its own 
nationals. Although the treaties do not expressly discuss choice-of-law rules, it is 
commonly acknowledged that the national treatment principle implicates a rule of 
territoriality. 
Subafilms, Ltd. v. Mgm-Pathe Commc’ns. Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); 
see also Richard Stim, Does My U.S. Copyright Give Me Worldwide Protection from Infringement?, 
NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/international-copyright-protection.html 
[https://perma.cc/2TK9-5ZWX] (last visited Mar. 9, 2020) (noting the “reciprocal approach is 
commonly called ‘national treatment’”). 
 200. In addition to the Berne Convention’s reciprocal protection, the Copyright Act eliminates the 
requirement for foreign authors whose nation of origin is a Berne Convention member. 17 U.S.C. 
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Elimination of § 411’s registration requirement for United States 
works would remove this disparity and put the American author on a 
level playing field with the Canadian author. Not only would the 
American not have to register to obtain relief in her own country, but 
she would also be exempt from registering in Canada, as her home 
country would no longer require registration. As a result, reciprocal 
protection would continue to be adhered to while eliminating the 
registration formality in accordance with Article 5(2) of the Berne 
Convention.201 
Consequently, the lack of a registration requirement does bring 
some important questions to the fore. Most notably, how does one 
know if a work is protected if it cannot be found in a national 
registry? However, discarding the registration requirement to file suit 
does not remove all incentives for a copyright owner to register.202 
For example, foreign authors from Berne Convention countries are 
not exempt from presuit registration if they want the possibility of 
being awarded statutory damages and attorney’s fees.203 Similarly, 
elimination of § 411’s registration requirement for authors of 
American works would not affect the requirements for American 
authors to also be awarded statutory damages and attorney’s fees. 
The large monetary awards that these sections can provide are 
enough incentive for an author to continue registering his works with 
the Copyright Office. 
Moreover, just as eliminating the notice requirement did not stop 
copyright owners from putting notice on their published works, 
abandoning the registration requirement will not keep owners from 
                                                                                                             
§ 411(a); see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, § 3.15. 
 201. See Berne Convention, supra note 13. 
 202. In addition to bringing an infringement action, copyright registration has other benefits 
including: (1) evidence that you have a valid copyright, (2) the ability to claim statutory damages and 
attorney’s fees, (3) the creation of a public record, and (4) satisfaction of the Copyright Office’s deposit 
requirement. Why Should I Register My Work if Copyright Protection Is Automatic?, COPYRIGHT 
ALLIANCE, https://copyrightalliance.org/ca_faq_post/copyright-protection-ata/ [https://perma.cc/26YL-
87NW] (last visited Mar. 9, 2020). 
 203. See COMPENDIUM (THIRD), supra note 128, § 2000 (explaining that, though “foreign works do 
not need to be registered (or refused registration) in order to file an infringement lawsuit in the United 
States . . . they must be registered in a timely manner to seek statutory damages and attorney’s fees”). 
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registering their works voluntarily.204 One comparable incentive 
between voluntary notice and voluntary registration is alerting the 
world that the author has created the work.205 Registration forever 
attaches the author’s name to the work in the Library of Congress for 
all the world to see.206 Also, like voluntary notice, voluntary 
registration is a deterrent against infringement because it enables 
anyone to see if a work is protected.207 As such, elimination of the 
registration requirement under § 411 will not deter authors or 
copyright owners from voluntarily registering their copyrights with 
the Copyright Office. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States Supreme Court has officially resolved the circuit 
split regarding the interpretation of § 411’s requirement to register a 
work with the Copyright Office prior to filing an infringement suit.208 
Though the Supreme Court interpreted the Copyright Act to support 
the registration approach, the application approach best effectuates 
the Copyright Act’s purpose by preventing legal limbo, promoting 
judicial economy, and putting Americans on more level ground with 
foreign authors.209 Moreover, the purpose of copyright registration 
would not be frustrated if Congress were to completely eliminate 
                                                                                                             
 204. See Landau, supra note 157, at 869 (“When the United States became a member of the Berne 
Convention, the requirement that one must publish a work with proper copyright notice (e.g., © 2007, 
Michael Landau) was made optional, instead of mandatory. The publication of a work without copyright 
notice on or after March 1, 1989 would not result in the work falling into the public domain.”). 
 205. See id. at 867 (noting that “an author or a copyright owner might want the world to know who is 
associated with the work”); see also Jonathan Bailey, Why Bother with a Copyright Notice?, 
PLAGIARISM TODAY (June 27, 2012), https://www.plagiarismtoday.com/2012/06/27/why-bother-with-a-
copyright-notice/ [https://perma.cc/GLA9-6QFY] (explaining that even though notice is not required in 
most countries, “having a notice may provide some protection in those that do,” because putting notice 
on a work “prevents confusion on the nature of the work and keeps others from thinking it is not 
copyrighted . . . [and] eliminates innocent infringer claims”). 
 206. The Library of Congress’s catalog can be searched online. Catalog, LIBR. CONGRESS, 
https://catalog.loc.gov/vwebv/searchBrowse [https://perma.cc/T4HH-QF9K] (last visited Mar. 9, 2020). 
 207. Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 27 (1988) (stating that notice is “the cheapest deterrent to 
infringement which a copyright holder may take”). 
 208. See supra Part II. 
 209. See supra Section IV.A. 
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§ 411’s registration requirement.210 Continuing to require registration 
in order for copyright owners to obtain statutory damages and 
attorney’s fees, coupled with a desire to put the world on notice that 
they have created a copyrightable work that may not be infringed will 
continue to encourage copyright owners to register their         
works—thus, maintaining a robust library of copyrights. 
                                                                                                             
 210. See supra Section IV.B. 
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